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Market Forces, Diversification 
of Activity, and the Mission 
of No  t-for -Profit Hospitals 
Richard G. Frank and David S. Salkever 
6.1  Introduction 
Bradford Gray, in his introduction to the report  The New Health Care 
for Projit,  observed that  “Our dominant  medical  institutions-hospi- 
tals-have  their origins in charity and local government and have long 
been  seen as serving the public interest. Nonprofit  hospitals benefited 
from tax exemptions and had public funds and charitable donations as the 
primary sources of money for construction. Hospitals were seen by many 
as serving a distinct ethic. . . . Its obligation to its community is not mea- 
sured by its net earnings, but by the service it renders . .  .”  (Gray 1983, 7). 
Much of the implicit contract reflected in the above passage has changed. 
Hospitals  are less dominant  as medical care providers than  they  once 
were, as more and more services have been developed outside the hospi- 
tals’ walls (e.g., freestanding ambulatory surgery centers, imaging centers). 
Direct public funds and charitable donations are now far less important 
for capital projects than is debt financing and retained earnings. The basic 
mission of not-for-profit hospitals is often unclear to policy makers, con- 
sumers, and even donors who question the degree to which “community 
benefit” is in fact funded by  public monies (through tax preferences) or 
private donations. 
The picture is  further complicated by  new  trends that are appearing 
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in the medical care marketplace. Not-for-profit community hospitals are 
increasingly engaging in new activities that have been organized as profit- 
making operations. Home health care companies, nursing homes, wellness 
centers, durable medical equipment companies, real estate partnerships, 
and health clubs are among the for-profit enterprises that are commonly 
reported by not-for-profit hospitals. Accompanying the expansion of joint 
ventures and the creation of profit-making subsidiaries are a number of 
new service offerings aimed at augmenting revenues and retained earnings. 
These services include satellite clinics, urgent care centers, and industrial 
medicine centers. It appears that the rate of revenue growth for these new 
enterprises exceeds the rate of growth of  “traditional”  hospital revenue 
sources such as charitable giving and third-party payment for inpatient 
and outpatient care. The end result is a concern that the necessity of en- 
gaging in new revenue-generating activities that are not part of the tradi- 
tional core services and populations of the hospital may compromise tra- 
ditional notions of the not-for-profit hospital’s mission, such as serving 
the medically indigent.’ 
In  this paper we  conduct an initial exploration  of the links between 
some of the new  developments in the health care marketplace  and the 
adherence  of  not-for-profit  hospitals  to  some  of  their  traditional 
community-oriented  services. The paper is organized into four sections. 
Following this introduction, we review some overall trends in the hospital 
market. Section 6.3 gives a very brief exposition, at a conceptual level, of 
some possible connections between diversification and supply of public 
goods or “community benefit.” Section 6.4 is a detailed report on focus 
groups with hospital executives that explored possible links between not- 
for-profit  status,  diversification, and public  goods.  Finally,  section  6.5 
makes some observations on what has been learned and proposes direc- 
tion for further investigation. 
6.2  Trends in the Market for Hospital Services 
The not-for-profit  form remains dominant in the market for hospital 
services. Table 6.1 presents data from the American Hospital Association 
(AHA) on the numbers of community hospitals and beds by  ownership 
category. Overall, the total number of community hospital beds has fallen 
by about 13 percent from the peak in  1985. The number of beds in not- 
for-profit hospitals has declined about 14 percent since the peak. The re- 
sult, as indicated in the table, is great stability in the share of beds ac- 
counted for by not-for-profit community hospitals at 70 percent over the 
1. Recent empirical support for this concern is reported  by  Young, Desai, and Lucas 
(1997) who find litile evidence of declines in uncompensated care when not-for-profit com- 
munity hospitals in California were acquired by for-profit corporations. The generalizability 
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Table 6.1  Hospital Statistics 
1970  1980  1985  1990  1995 
No. not-for-profit  3,386  3,332  3,349  3,191  3,092 
No. beds  592  692  707  657  610 
No. for-profit  769  730  805  749  752 
No. beds  53  87  104  101  106 
No. public (nonfederal)  1,704  1,778  1,578  1,444  1,350 
No. beds  204  209  189  169  157 
No. combined  5,859  5,840  5,732  5,384  5,194 
No. beds  849  988  1,000  927  873 
Bed share (community hospitals, YO) 
Not-for-profit  70.0  70.0  71.0  71.0  70.0 
For-profit  6.2  8.8  10.4  10.9  12.1 
For-profit  69  119  129  135  141 
Average bed size 
Not-for-profit  175  208  21 1  206  197 
Source: 1970 data from AHA (1987); data for 1980, 1985, 1990, and 1995 from AHA (1997). 
past 25 years. It also suggests that the roughly doubling of the for-profit 
share of  beds (from 6.2 percent to 12.1 percent) came almost entirely at 
the expense of the share accounted for by publicly owned community hos- 
pitals. Table 6.1 also points to the fact that while not-for-profit commun- 
ity hospitals are on average larger than their for-profit counterparts, the 
difference in size has been narrowing over time. This may be due in part 
to a convergence in the roles played by  the two ownership forms (Sloan 
1997). 
During the  15 years reported, community hospitals have experienced 
substantial changes in their treatment  patterns  and revenues. This has, 
in part, been driven by changes in payment arrangements, such as Medi- 
care’s Prospective Payment System (PPS), more aggressive price negotia- 
tions with managed care organizations, and changes in community support. 
Admissions to community hospitals, overall, have declined by  about 22 
percent in the period from 1983 to 1995 (AHA 1997). Hospital stays have 
also declined, falling from an average of seven days in 1983 to slightly less 
than six days in  1995. Table 6.2 reports the annual average percentage 
growth in real community hospital revenues. The rate of growth in hospital 
revenues has dropped notably in real terms since the early 1980s. In 1996, 
for the first time, there was an actual fall in the level of hospital revenues 
as indicated by  the negative rate of growth. Figure 6.1 shows the total 
(from all payers) payment-cost margins for various types of hospitals dur- 
ing the 1984-97  time period (PPS 1-14).  Several trends are worth noting. 
The margins for both private for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals were 
at 8.75 percent and 7.75 percent, respectively, in 1984 and fell substantially 
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Table 6.2  Annual Percent Growth in Real Hospital Revenues 
Hospitals 
Year  Overall  Outpatient 
1981  7.5  9.8 
1984  2.1  6.2 
1988  5.1  6.4 
1990  3.8  6.0 
1996  -1.0  -0.5 
Source; Prospective Payment Assessment Commission (1997). 
11, 
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Fig. 6.1 
Source: MedPac analysis of data from the Health Care Financing Administration. 
Note; Data for PPS14 are partial and subject to revision. 
Total margins by ownership category, first 14 years of PPS 
cent by the latter part of the 1980s and have remained at a level of 4 to 
4.5 percent since. For-profit hospital margins also fell sharply during the 
mid-1980s but have grown steadily since, returning to a 9 percent level in 
recent years. Public hospitals entered the PPS period at lower margin lev- 
els and experienced major  reductions during the  1980s. They have re- 
turned to levels of 3 to 4.5 percent in recent years. Thus, while hospitals 
have generally faced increasingly tight revenues, both for-profit and not- 
for-profit entities have managed to reduce costs sufficiently to increase 
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Table 6.3  Not-for-Profit Revenue Shares and Philanthropy 
1977  1982  1987  1992 
Private contributions (“YO)  7.8  5.9  5.4  3.6 
Private pay (“XI)  49.1  49.1  51.8  48.3 
Government pay (%)  32.4  34.8  36.2  40.7 
Other (%)  10.7  10.1  6.6  7.4 
Contributions ($billions)  4.0  6.2  8.1  9.3 
Real value of contributions 
($billions)  4.00  3.89  4.33  4.00 
Source: Independent Sector (1997). 
Not-for-profit hospitals have traditionally relied on revenues from sales 
as  well  as  revenues  from  charitable  contributions.  Researchers  have 
pointed to the shifting roles of different sources of  funds. Sloan et al. 
(1990) show that the reliance of not-for-profit hospitals on philanthropy 
has declined since the 1960s. They offer evidence suggesting that insurance 
coverage “crowds out” philanthropy. Frank, Salkever, and Mitchell (1990) 
provide evidence indicating that donations are negatively associated with 
hospital profits. Smith, Clement, and Wheeler (1995) estimate a positive 
association between “returns to the community” and donations to not- 
for-profit hospitals. One might therefore expect some increases in philan- 
thropy in recent years when there was erosion of both insurance and hos- 
pital margins (during the middle part of the 1980~).~ 
Table 6.3 reports information on revenue shares of not-for-profit health 
care providers (predominantly hospitals) from different payer sources, and 
the nominal and real levels of philanthropy during the period 1977-92. 
Two important points emerge from the table. First, the share of revenues 
accounted for by private contributions to not-for-profit hospitals has con- 
tinuously declined during the 15-year period observed, from 7.8 percent 
to 3.6 per~ent.~  Second, even though the nominal value of contributions 
grew from $4  billion in 1977 to $9.3 billion in  1992 (a 133 percent in- 
crease), the real value of  philanthropic contributions remained constant 
at $4 billion. Data on contributions to not-for-profit hospitals in Califor- 
nia (table 6.4) mirrors this downward trend in the role of  philanthropy. 
For the 174 hospitals reporting data in both 1990 and 1996, the size of 
contributions relative to gross patient revenues fell from 0.82 percent to 
0.52 percent. (The much smaller percentage in the California data relative 
to the data in table 6.3 probably results from the fact that many contribu- 
2. Sloan (1997) acknowledges that insurance has eroded in recent years. He argues that 
the erosion is quite small compared to the expansion in coverage that took place during the 
1960s and 1970s. 
3. The Independent Sector data have been criticized as being somewhat inaccurate. Thus, 
we direct the reader to the gross trend rather than a specific estimate of Philanthropy. 200  Richard G.  Frank and David S. Salkever 
Table 6.4  California Not-for-Profit Hospitals: Summary of Restricted and 
Unrestricted Donations as a Share of Gross Patient Revenue 
1990  1996 
Hospital mean  0.007  0.010 
Median  0.0005  0.0004 
Percentage > 0  65.52  62.64 
Revenue weighted mean (mean donation/ 
mean gross patient revenue)  0.0082  0.0052 
Note: Data include only hospitals  present  as not-for-profit  providers in  1990 and  1996; 
N  = 174. 
tions are given to legally separate hospital foundations and, for accounting 
reasons, are not captured on the state’s hospital financial reports.) 
These data notwithstanding, some observers of the industry have noted 
an increased level of fundraising efforts by hospitals and particularly aca- 
demic health centers (e.g., Ginzberg 1996, 72). There are several factors 
that might explain why  the aggregate donations data do not yet reflect a 
corresponding increase: (1) lags in data collection, (2) incompleteness of 
the available data on total donations, and (3) variability among nonprofit 
hospitals, with increased fundraising efforts by  academic health centers 
and decreased efforts by other hospitals. 
In addition to changing the level of fundraising effort, another possible 
response by  hospitals to constrained revenues from traditional sources is 
to alter the  composition  of  their  products  and  activities toward  more 
profitable lines of  business. Sloan (1997) notes that there is limited evi- 
dence on this point. Previous research noted that during the mid-1980s a 
substantial portion of not-for-profit hospitals restructured (34 percent). 
One common approach to restructuring was to create subsidiaries. Among 
the central motivations for diversification by creation of subsidiaries is to 
increase market share and to generate new sources of revenues (Clement, 
D’Aunno, and Poyzer 1993). The evidence on the consequences of diversi- 
fication is limited. Shortell, Morrison, and Hughes (1989) found that only 
about 30 percent of the diversified services offered by eight multihospital 
systems were profitable. Clement et al. (1993) examined diversification of 
hospital activities in Virginia in 1987; they found that 62 percent of all the 
hospitals were engaged in  some type of nonhospital subsidiary. The key 
results regarding the consequences of  diversification suggest that older 
subsidiaries and those that are directly engaged in  health care services 
tended to be the most profitable. 
Other suggestive information from a recent study by  the General Ac- 
counting Office (GAO) and from the American Hospital Association’s an- 
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for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals into for-profit joint ventures with 
various classes of business  partner^.^ The GAO (1993) reported significant 
increases in  the number of  both not-for-profit and for-profit hospitals 
entering into joint ventures between  1984 and 1991. The GAO found a 
doubling of  the percentage of not-for-profit hospitals engaged in joint 
ventures, from 9 to 18 percent. The corresponding change observed in 
for-profit hospitals was from 14 to 20 percent. Among the most commonly 
cited joint ventures were primary care clinics, imaging centers, and home 
health care companies. The GAO also noted that the joint ventures pur- 
sued by not-for-profits  were less oriented toward serving those that cannot 
pay for their care than was the not-for-profit parent hospital. For example, 
2.8 percent of spending by  the joint ventures were devoted to care of the 
poor compared to 11.4 percent of spending by the parent hospital. 
The diversification of activities by  not-for-profit hospitals is also re- 
flected by the results of the 1995 American Hospital Association’s annual 
survey. Urban hospitals in particular are engaged in for-profit joint ven- 
tures. The AHA reports that 48 percent of urban hospitals are engaged in 
for-profit joint ventures. In addition, about 25 percent of all not-for-profit 
hospitals were part of a physician-hospital organization (PHO) and 18.6 
percent participated in an independent practice association (IPA). 
The trend toward diversification in response to financial pressure raises 
social concerns primarily because these new activities may divert hospitals 
from some of their traditional roles and social responsibilities. Students of 
hospital management have also questioned the wisdom of diversification 
because of the potential distraction created for management away from 
the core business of the hospital. Recent evidence on the supply of social 
goods offers little indication that there have been major shifts in the supply 
of hospital care to medically indigent populations. Mann et al. (1997) ex- 
amined trends in uncompensated care based on national surveys for the 
period 1983-95.  In the aggregate, the growth in value of uncompensated 
care, as reported by Mann et al., has been substantial, expanding by nearly 
50 percent in real terms between 1983 and 1995. Since 1993 the rate of 
growth in uncompensated care has slowed. When viewed relative to either 
hospital spending or the number of uninsured people, the picture of un- 
compensated care changes. Hospital spending has grown more rapidly in 
recent years than has the value of uncompensated care. Uncompensated 
care accounted for 5.2 percent of hospital spending in 1983, 6.2 percent 
in  1987, and 6.1 percent in 1995. The value of uncompensated care per 
uninsured individual ranged from $401 in 1983, to $488 in 1988, to $431 
in 1995, indicating that the number of uninsured people grew more quickly 
4. Partners include groups of physicians, real estate developers, for-profit health care pro- 
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during the 1990s than did the supply of uncompensated care.s The data 
on the share of uncompensated care provided by  for-profit and not-for- 
profit hospitals show that the not-for-profit share has remained fixed at 
about 56 percent, while the for-profit share has grown from 4.1 percent to 
5.3 percent. This compares to their shares of total spending in 1995 of 73 
percent for not-for-profits and 8.2 percent for for-profits. 
In summary, the evidence suggests that hospitals have experienced a 
period of tighter revenues and reduced demand for their traditional inpa- 
tient  care services. Both not-for-profit  and for-profit hospitals  have re- 
cently experienced growth in their price-cost margins that appears to be 
explainable by efforts to reduce costs and by hospitals shifting the supply 
of services in the direction of more profitable services. Both the available 
statistics  and the  results  of  interviews suggest that  the  shift  to more 
profitable lines of business by  not-for-profit  hospitals has been accom- 
plished by the development of new products within the traditional hospital 
structure as well as creation of for-profit subsidiaries and joint ventures 
with for-profit organizations. 
6.3  Conceptualizing the Relationship of 
Diversification to Community Benefit 
In this section, we  begin by  sketching a conceptual model of the not- 
for-profit hospital that builds on our previous work and that of others 
(Frank and Salkever 1991; Gruber  1994; Thorpe and Phelps  1991) to 
characterize the potential issues relating to diversification. We begin with 
a hospital management objective function defined over net revenue (T), 
“public” goods (X),  and the quantities of two services, Hand 2,  which are 
defined as “traditional” hospital  services and new “diversified” services, 
respectively. Public goods may include, for example, participation in clini- 
cal research, education, or provision of care for the uninsured. We assume 
that the prices of H and 2 services are set exogenously. The hospital may 
also receive revenue from the government as a subsidy for its provision of 
public goods; let r denote the exogenous per unit subsidy. The hospital 
also receives a flow of donations, D, which is assumed to depend upon the 
hospital’s mix of services delivered; that is, D = D(H, 2,  X).6 Costs in- 
curred are based on the cost function C(H, Z,  X).  Thus, the hospital man- 
ager’s problem is 
5. The estimates of the number of uninsured people must be interpreted with considerable 
caution because obtaining an accurate count for person years uninsured is quite difficult 
given the available data. It should also be noted that Mann et al. (1997) have made an effort 
to adjust the data based on the most recent methods for estimating the number of uninsured. 
6.  An alternative but equivalent formulation of the problem would make D depend explic- 
itly  on T.  Thus, the above formulation might be most properly viewed as a reduced-form 
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(1)  blvlgU(m, H,  X,  Z),  subjectto 
(2)  T  = P,H  + PzZ  +  rX + D(H,  Z,  X)  - C(H,  2, X).’ 
First-order conditions for maximization imply the standard results that 
provision of H  and Z  should be pushed to the point where their price plus 
their direct marginal utility (relative to the marginal utility of net revenue) 
equals their “net” marginal cost, which includes both actual marginal pro- 
duction cost and any marginal impact of provision of H  or Z  on the flow 
of donations, D. (We assume that UT >  0 at the optimum.) If the manage- 
ment derives utility directly from provision of H  and Z  (i.e., U,,  U, > 0), 
the optimal supply of H  and Z  will occur at a point where the net marginal 
cost exceeds price for both services.* This implies that an exogenous up- 
ward shift in the hospital’s donation supply function will tend to increase 
H  and Z  if these are “normal” goods to the hospital managernenLg  The 
first-order conditions for optimal choice of X are similar except that the 
“price” of Xis the per unit subsidy r. 
The focus of our inquiry in this paper is the implications of diversifica- 
tion  for the behavior  of  the nonprofit hospital in  supplying “public” 
goods. Diversification here means choosing to move Z  from a zero to 
positive level; increasing the level of Z  could be viewed as increasing diver- 
sification. The corresponding comparative statics question would be: How 
does, say, optimal X  change when P,  increases relative to P,?  (The in- 
crease in P, could be viewed as an exogenous increase in the profit oppor- 
tunities from diversification.) 
How does an increase in Pz  affect the optimal amount of X? As might 
be expected, an unambiguous direction of effect cannot be determined in 
general. If one makes the simplifying assumptions that the managerial 
preference function is additively separable in profit and linear in profit, 
the sign and magnitude of the effect depends upon (1)  the sign (presum- 
ably positive) and size of the cross-partials of U with respect to X,  H,  and 
Z,  and (2) the corresponding cross-partials of the donation supply and 
7. The assumption that the hospital chooses H, X,  and Z implies either perfect competition 
or price regulation with persistent excess demand. The model could be expanded to allow 
for choice of nonprice “quality” or “amenity” attributes, with fixed prices, which affect the 
quantities of H,  X,  and Z that are actually “sold.” 
8. Note that the formulation given here yields a similar reduced form to that employed by 
Sloan et al. (1990). The models are slightly different in that we allow for multiple outputs and 
we do not explicitly incorporate solicitation effort. The reduced forms are similar, however, in 
that the hospital is viewed as choosing its “policy variables” (in our case H, X,  and Z) taking 
account of the implications for this choice on donor supply. 
9. It may be helpful to conceive of this formulation as a single-period condensed function 
of a multiperiod model in which hospitals need to accumulate capital in the present period 
to invest and expand the supply of H  and Z in future periods. From that perspective, the 
increase in donations in the current period  would be  used in part to fund investment in 
subsequent periods and thereby expand H andor Z. 204  Richard G. Frank and David S. Sakever 
cost function. If the latter are all zero, an increase in Pz  results in a decline 
in the supply of X. 
While the implications of nonzero cross-partials for the donation supply 
and cost function are complex and interrelated, we offer several hypothe- 
ses about the signs of these cross-partials.  These hypotheses are informally 
tested against anecdotal evidence from the focus groups below. 
With respect to cross-partials and second partials in the cost function, 
we  expect that all marginal costs tend to increase beyond some point as 
total output of H, X,  and Z expands. We further propose that economies 
of scope may exist between H and X. For example, a hospital that treats 
more patients is better able to produce clinical research because it has 
more patients as potential  research subjects. Similarly, a hospital that 
treats a larger number of paying patients can presumably supply any given 
volume of  charity care to uninsured persons at lower cost because the 
problem of finding and triaging these uninsured persons is less costly when 
the total patient flow is larger. 
With regard to the cross-partials of the donation-supply function, we 
expect that 2  will tend to reduce the marginal donation revenue from an 
additional unit of X. In other words, increasing diversification will tend 
to reduce the supply response of donors to provision of public goods. The 
fact that the hospital is in many lines of business increases the uncertainty 
among donors that contributions will  in fact go to support the public 
goods (X)  that they wish to subsidize. The fact that the hospital is treating 
paying patients (H)  will create this uncertainty, but if H is viewed by do- 
nors as complementary in production to X,  their donation to the hospital 
is likely to result in an increased supply of X  even if  some of it is also 
used to expand the volume of H. In contrast, if some donation funds are 
channeled to increased production of 2,  and economies of scope do not 
exist between 2  and X,  the hospital's increased production of 2  will create 
uncertainty on the part of donors that their donations will in fact be used 
to increase the volume of X supplied in the future.'O This can be depicted 
as a general downward shift in the donation supply function and as a down- 
ward shift in the marginal donation revenue from increasing  the supply of X. 
6.4  Mission and Diversification: Findings from the Focus Groups 
Three focus groups were conducted during October 1997, one in Boston 
and two in Chicago. Hospitals invited to participate were midsize (150- 
400 beds) not-for-profit community hospitals. Major academic medical 
centers were not invited. The 14 participating hospitals generally fit this 
10. The notion that uncertainty about the ultimate use of funds diminishes donation sup- 
ply has been recently advanced and explored in a general context by Bilodeau and Slivin- 
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profile, with three exceptions. Representatives from a not-for-profit reha- 
bilitation hospital, an academic medical center, and a for-profit commu- 
nity hospital were included in the focus groups. Each participant filled out 
a brief survey prior to the meeting of the focus group that elicited informa- 
tion on the participants (title, years of experience, and percent of  time 
spent on planning issues) and the hospitals (name, bed size, statement of 
mission, and who is responsible for preserving the mission of the hospital) 
(see the appendix). Two of the three groups consisted of three participants 
and the third included eight individuals.  *I A professional moderator led 
each focus group discussion and followed a relatively broad outline (see 
the appendix) supplemented by specific examples and probes to be used 
to advance the discussion.lZ  Below we report on the major points made by 
participants that were broadly held. 
The purpose of the focus group discussions was to elicit views of hos- 
pital executives on four main topics: (1) the hospital's objective function 
(i.e., mission), (2) the role of  philanthropy and fund raising in hospital 
financing, (3) the causes of the trend toward diversification, and (4) how 
hospitals are altering their service mix in response to the changing pay- 
ment system. 
6.4.1  Diversification 
All participating hospitals were  engaged in at least one or two joint 
ventures. The hospital executives pointed to two types of activities that 
might be viewed in terms of diversification. One approach related to the 
development of new products within the confines of the traditional hospi- 
tal organization (that is, without joint venture partners or subsidiaries). 
These included occupational medicine clinics, urgent care centers, and 
wellness clinics. In some cases, wholly owned for-profit subsidiaries were 
created; for example, one hospital entered the nursing home business 
through a wholly owned subsidiary. Home health programs and durable 
medical equipment companies were also organized in this way.  Another 
approach to diversification involved joint ventures and creation of jointly 
owned for-profit subsidiaries. Commonly mentioned joint-venture enter- 
prises were  primary care clinics, medical office  buildings, surgi-centers, 
imaging centers, and health clubs. Most indicated that the diversified ac- 
tivities were profitable. The nursing homes, home health care companies, 
and medical office  buildings were  most  often pointed to as successful 
profit-making enterprises. 
11. One group began with four participants but was reduced to three because of concerns 
that the individual had not received clearance from the hospital CEO to discuss the issues 
that were proposed. 
12. Videotapes, audio tapes, and transcripts of the three focus groups were provided the 
authors and are available for review subject to the confidentiality  rules established with the 
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6.4.2  Not-for-Profit Hospital Objectives 
Several themes emerged in the discussion regarding the mission of not- 
for-profit community hospitals and how it might differ from the mission 
of for-profit hospitals. In the general statements of mission by the partici- 
pating hospitals, all refer to provision of high-quality, low-cost health care 
to the community. They also claim the promotion of health in the commu- 
nity to be a goal of the organization and a relatively new aspect of mission. 
The basis for pursuing this goal appears to lie in (1) an expanded view of 
health and health care among both professionals and the general public, 
and (2) an approach to marketing that establishes the hospital’s identity 
as the place to go for health care. It was especially notable that the only 
for-profit hospital represented in the group was very active in prevention/ 
screening programs and other outreach activities involving mobile vans. 
The representative of the for-profit stated the following: “With prevention 
. . .  really . . .  you’re looking for market share, whether you charge or do 
it free . .  . you want people to think of  you when they think of  health 
care.” All of the participants were in basic agreement with this assessment. 
The literature has generally viewed the provision of health promotion as 
being a social good, but its supply also appears to be consistent with profit 
maximization. 
The importance of strong financial performance was noted repeatedly 
by the participants. The increasing emphasis on financial performance, in 
the face of competitive pressures and constraints from payers, was viewed 
as affecting the priority placed on other aspects of the hospital’s mission. 
As a further indication of the strength of competitive uncertainties, most 
of the participants characterized their institutions as exposed to substan- 
tial longer term risk. 
The participants acknowledged the role of the hospital as a charitable 
institution. Some noted the role of the hospital as the “provider of  last 
resort”; others pointed to a duty to attend to underserved populations. It 
was nevertheless striking that treating the underserved or the medically 
indigent was generally not mentioned in the basic statement of mission 
nor as a major concern of most of the participants. In fact, there was sub- 
stantial agreement that a hospital’s commitment to serving the poor and 
uninsured is  largely a consequence of  location decisions taken decades 
earlier. 
In  summary, while the objective function proposed in  section 6.3 is 
broadly consistent with the discussion in the focus groups, we  view much 
of the discussion as implying a large weight on current and future profits 
in the face of perceived financial and competitive risks. Market Forces, Diversification, and Not-for-Profit  Hospitals  207 
6.4.3  The Role of Philanthropy 
The aggregate national data from the early 1990s reported earlier sug- 
gests that 3.6 percent of revenues were philanthropic contributions. Sev- 
eral participants in the focus groups estimated their philanthropic contri- 
butions to be approximately 1 percent of revenues. The academic medical 
center and one hospital located in a very affluent suburb reported that 
they received substantial levels of philanthropy but noted that they were 
likely to be exceptional. In general, fund raising was either a small activity 
or was part of a larger effort aimed at marketing services to the community 
and public relations. Several participants noted that this was a very sub- 
stantial change from earlier years, when much of the capital for the origi- 
nal building or new construction came from philanthropy. They generally 
agreed that philanthropy could serve to provide “add-ons” that might be 
valued by patients or families but could not be paid for directly through 
insurance funds. One specific example was overnight accommodations in 
the hospital for parents whose children were inpatients. These “add-ons” 
were seen as valued by the community, but they could also be viewed  (a 
view  not explicitly expressed by  the participants) as enhancing market 
share. 
The discussion of fund raising yielded a number of important impres- 
sions regarding the link between hospital financial performance and dona- 
tions (which is tied to the cross-partial of X and Z in the donation supply 
function described earlier). The observations made suggest that there are 
two specific indicators of financial performance that tend to affect dona- 
tions: overall hospital margins and investment income. Members of a hos- 
pital’s board of  trustees in particular are aware of  the financial perfor- 
mance of the hospital and typically have a variety of competing demands 
for their financial support. Thus, in years where hospitals have strong fi- 
nancial performances (large or growing margins and significant invest- 
ment income), board members tend to offer less financial support. Simi- 
larly, the larger community is less well  informed, but its donations still 
appear to be sensitive to the financial performance of the hospital. A num- 
ber of participants also pointed to a general public perception that hospi- 
tals are somewhat “bloated” organizations and are therefore less deserving 
of financial support. The construction of  large office buildings and the 
continued rise of hospital prices serve to reinforce this general perception. 
The end result is that donations play a very small role in hospital strategic 
decision making, and a larger share of donations now have restrictions 
placed on their use than was once the case.I3 
13. The reduction in flexibility is in part due to donors’ concerns about the use of their 
contributions  (the agency problem) and because fund raising appears to focus more on spe- 
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6.4.4  Explaining DiversificatiodJoint Venture 
One simple explanation for diversification, noted earlier, is  that in- 
creased financial pressure leads hospitals to seek new sources of revenues 
and funds. That observation would explain a desire by  hospitals to seek 
new  “products” but not necessarily to choose for-profit subsidiaries or 
joint ventures as the means for attracting the new revenues. The discussion 
in the focus groups pointed to another important explanation for a num- 
ber of the joint ventures and subsidiary activities of not-for-profit hospi- 
tals. The explanation is summarized here. 
Most hospital markets in the nation are characterized by excess capacity 
and relatively high levels of competition. Thus, retaining and expanding 
market share has gained an increasingly central place in hospital strategic 
planning since the risk of rapid declines in market share are much clearer 
than in the past. Competition stems primarily from other not-for-profit 
hospitals but also from for-profit hospitals and more specialized health 
care  providers  (niche  players).  This  latter  group  might  include  free- 
standing clinics, surgi-centers, and urgent care centers. At the same time, 
traditional relationships with office-based physicians have been altered. 
Physicians, who typically have admitting privileges at several hospitals, 
have become more aggressive in negotiating terms for their appointments 
with hospitals. This is in part due to new constraints on physician earnings 
as well as the advent of for-profit physician management companies that 
are well informed and experienced in negotiation with hospitals. The result 
is that the demand for hospital services is becoming less predictable. 
Hospitals can potentially gain market share and reduce the uncertainty 
in demand by  pursuing strategies that (1)  offer new products directly to 
consumers and (2) make their relationships with office-based physicians 
more exclusive. Sloan (1997) also notes that “product” innovations are 
important means for hospitals to expand into more-profitable services. He 
cites examples of hospitals adopting new technologies, including cardiac 
catheterization programs, inpatient mental health units following imple- 
mentation of PPS, and expansion of rehabilitation units in more recent 
years. Participants in the focus groups identified wellness programs, pri- 
mary care clinics, and urgent care centers as examples of new services that 
are profitable. The primary care clinics were pointed to as being particu- 
larly important. This was because, in these subsidiaries,  the physicians are 
often employees of the clinic. Thus, the hospital begins to develop a direct 
relationship with an organization that will steer patients in its direction. It 
was noted that some hospitals make an effort not to publicly link the clinic 
and the hospital, thereby reinforcing the impression of patients that one’s 
“doctor just refers most of hidher cases to one hospital.” In this manner, 
the hospital reduces its dependence on private, office-based attending phy- 
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Joint ventures offer some similar advantages in terms of generating new 
streams of revenues and stabilizing demand. A number of for-profit  joint 
ventures involve enterprises such as primary care clinics, home health 
companies, health and fitness clubs, and physician office buildings where 
partners in the joint ventures are  physician^.'^ By creating a for-profit joint 
venture that can pay partners (shareholders) a portion of the net reve- 
nues and is backed by hospital assets and access to capital, the hospital 
strengthens its ties with physicians, thereby strengthening incentives for 
physicians to want the hospital to prosper. These types of arrangements 
are an incomplete form of vertical integrati~n.'~  Several participants cited 
the desire to develop greater physician loyalty and more exclusive relations 
with physicians as being important factors in choosing to enter into cer- 
tain types of joint ventures. Several also had involvement in physician- 
hospital organizations, a strategy for alliance building between hospitals 
and staff physicians that may be particularly important for community 
hospitals in the coming years (Ginzberg 1996). 
6.4.5  Reduction and Elimination of Services 
In addition to looking for new opportunities to earn surpluses, hospitals 
also evaluate whether various traditional service operations need to be 
continued. All participants described strategic review of services. Some of 
the participating hospitals had eliminated obstetrics services, outsourced 
pathology services, or had changed the organization and management of 
the emergency department. Generally, they identified a set of conditions 
that led to elimination of services. They were: (1) the service was a money 
loser, (2) there were similar services available from nearby competitors, 
and (3) it was not considered fundamental to the hospital. We probed the 
focus group participants regarding whether emergency services might be 
eliminated if  they lost money. All of the hospital representatives stated 
that they viewed the emergency department as a core feature of the hos- 
pital and therefore would not eliminate it under any conceivable circum- 
stances. Several participants  noted that they had changed the manner 
in which the emergency department operated. Specifically, one hospital 
jointly staffed the emergency department with an urgent care outpatient 
clinic that met the pricing standards for most HMOs. The effect was to 
reduce the role of the emergency department and presumably to offer 
more appropriate levels of care to patients. 
The discussions with the representatives of not-for-profit hospitals par- 
ticipating in our focus group did not suggest that joint ventures and cre- 
ation of subsidiaries  were motivated primarily by seeking flexible revenues 
14. The focus group discussions revealed that there were  no meaningful joint ventures 
15. It is interesting to note that these practices are quite similar to those that have created 
outside of the health arena. 
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that could be used to maintain or expand charitable activities directed to 
care of the medically indigent. Nor did any participant identify the pro- 
vision of uncompensated care in pursuit of serving the community as a 
source of financial stress on their hospitals. Discretionary funds appear to 
be primarily directed toward new product development, joint ventures, 
and investment in financial markets. Thus, beyond adding to the general 
financial health of the hospitals, returns from profit-making activities do 
not seem to be targeted specifically to increased supply of social goods. 
6.5  Conclusions 
It is logical to expect that the emergence of price competition in the 
market for hospital services will threaten the traditional funding of charity 
care and other public goods by  not-for-profit hospitals through cross- 
subsidies. This expectation is also supported by  research that links in- 
creases in competitive pressures to declines in the supply of uncompen- 
sated care. It is also logical to expect this trend to increase the importance 
of philanthropy as a source of support for supplying these public goods 
and to conclude that a reversal of  the secular decline in philanthropic 
support will be needed to avoid a sharp reduction in the supply of public 
goods. 
Against this background, we  have examined the trend of hospitals to 
diversify into new lines of business. Our particular focus was on the notion 
that diversification could reduce the supply of public goods by  either (1) 
adversely affecting the supply of philanthropy, or (2) increasing the cost 
of public goods via diseconomies of scope. 
In our view, the focus group evidence reported here provides little sup- 
port for the idea that diversification adversely affects the supply of pub- 
lic goods. They appear not to consider it at all in strategic diversification 
decisions. There is recognition that high profit margins may impact nega- 
tively on the supply of philanthropy, but diversification per se is not seen 
as a factor in philanthropy supply. (A minor qualification might be added 
for the preference of some hospitals to not use their own name on joint 
venture projects, but clearly this was mainly motivated by a reluctance to 
appear as infringing on the clinical independence of physician-partners.) 
Information from the focus groups was less clear on the question of dis- 
economies of scope and the effect of diversification on the incremental 
cost of public goods supply. Finally, offsetting any of these possible nega- 
tive effects was the clear consensus that diversification efforts were profit- 
able. Some discounting of this evidence may be in order because of  the 
selected nature of our informants and their own personal involvement in 
diversification efforts, but their message seemed very clear. Diversification 
was a new source of profits that maintained the financial health of  the 
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These observations are also consistent with national trend data cited 
earlier. In the face of budgetary restraints from Medicare and Medicaid 
and the presumed rise in price competition in the private sector, hospital 
profit margins have not been shrinking and, in fact, have recently been 
rising. While we do not have information on operating margins for “tradi- 
tional” lines of hospital business versus margins on joint ventures, some 
of the recent increase in hospital margins is presumably due to joint ven- 
ture profits. In addition, it appears that margins on private sector patient 
care increased during the 1990s and have only recently started to decline 
but still remain strongly positive (Guterman, Ashby, and Greene 1996). 
Thus, our presumption that private sector margins are shrinking due to 
increased price competition may be at least premature if not incorrect. 
Managed care certainly appears to have an affect on the level of utilization 
and the rate of  increase of  total and unit revenues for hospital services, 
but hospitals’ responses in containing costs have thus far been more than 
sufficient to maintain healthy profit levels on “traditional” lines of busi- 
ness. 
In short, the initial presumption of our work-that  the supply of public 
goods was  being threatened by  the disappearance of cross-subsidies- 
needs to be modified. The flow of profits that are the source of the cross- 
subsidies has not dried up. Accordingly, even though the role of philan- 
thropy continues to diminish, the supply of some public goods (e.g., char- 
ity care) has not declined nationally. Additional funding sources have 
arisen, such as statewide indigent care pools, but profits continue to be an 
important funding source. 
The short-run success of  not-for-profit hospitals in  maintaining their 
profit margins is, however, no guarantee of future survival under present 
circumstances.  In the presence of substantial excess capacity, hospitals are 
financially  vulnerable to price pressures, especially in the inpatient market 
(Ginzberg 1996); concerns for survival may dominate, and diversification 
decisions may be largely driven by these survival concerns. The motivation 
for diversification in the form of joint ventures with physicians appears 
to be  greater forward integration with the physician practices that are 
an important component of the increasingly uncertain demand for “tra- 
ditional” hospital services. Preserving the supply of such specific social 
goods as care for the indigent is a secondary factor in this consideration. 212  Richard G. Frank and David S. Salkever 
Appendix 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
Greenleaf Associates, Inc. 
October, 1997 
Name:  Hospital: 
Title:  Years in Current Position: 
Previous position held, if any, in same hospital: 
1.  What do you feel is the most critical strategic planning issue currently facing 
your hospital? (Please describe.) 
2.  About what percent of your professional time is spent on strategic planning 
issues for your hospital? 
(Write in %) 
3.  What members of the hospital community are most influential in strategic 
planning decisions? (Please describe roleltitle; do not include names.) 
4.  How would you define the “mission” of your hospital? (Please describe.) 
5.  Who do you feel are the people most invested in preserving this “mission”? 
(Please describe.) Market Forces, Diversification, and Not-for-Profit Hospitals  213 
DISCUSSION GUIDE OUTLINE 
Strategic Planning for Notlfor-Profit Hospitals 
Monday, October 20, 1997 (Boston: 7:OO  PM) 
Tuesday, October 28, 1997 (Chicago: 6:30 PM) 
I.  Introduction 
A. Procedures 
B.  Participant introductions 
A. Mission of Not-for-Profit Hospitals 
11.  Background Information 
1.  Definitions of mission, of community 
2.  Importance of “mission” 
3.  Present commitment to mission: the entrenched vs. the drifting 
1. Principal gatekeepers and evolution of their roles 
2.  Role of board 
3.  Existence and membership of a Mission Affairs Committee 
Probe: Perceptions from community, from donors, from medical staff 
B.  Mission “Gatekeepers” 
Probe, as appropriate: Evolution of a committee’s role 
Probe: Involvement, if any, in committee’s balance of commercial and 
mission activities 
C. Pressures Affecting Pursuit of the Hospital’s Mission 
1. Principal pressures and degreeslarea of influence 
2.  Pressures from the “competition” 
(Easel summary of spontaneous mentions prior to moderator’s  probes) 
Probe: Perceived need and ability to “compete” 
Probe: Descriptors of the principal “competition” 
Probe: Extent to which competing is bolstered versus hindered by 
commitment to mission 
3. Financial pressures 
Probe: To what extent, in what areas 
4. Pressures from the community 
5.  Pressures from the medical staff 
111.  Strategic Planning 
A. Perceived Impact of Pressures on Not-for-Profit Hospitals 
1.  Areas most influenced and reasons why 
Probe: extent to which new directionslstrategies embracelconflict with 
mission 
Probe, as appropriate: Degree of departmental integration (e.g., 
financial, medical education, etc.), if any, drawn upon to accomplish 
new directionlstrategy 214  Richard G. Frank and David S. Salkever 
(Easel summary of  spontaneous mentions prior to moderator’s  probes. 
Areas probed will include brief discussion of  current involvement as well 
as anticipated future involvement) 
Probe: Motivating criteria for key donors and perceived points of 
conflict, if any 
Probe: Changes, if any, to volume and restrictedunrestricted 
donations and reasons why 
3. Effect on involvement with profit-making activities (e.g., imaging 
centers, wellness and/or fitness centers, sleep centers) 
Probe: Effect of diversification into “high margin”, non-traditional 
activities on “organizational” culture (to include process/cost/size/ 
complexity of management) 
health areas, MD partnerships, insurance) andor mergers 
2. Effect on fund raising efforts 
4. Effect on involvement with subsidiaries/joint ventures (e.g., home 
5. Effect on staffing (e.g., quality of staffing, morale) 
6.  Effect on quality of care issues 
1.  Prioritization of principal issues: current and near future 
B.  Key Dilemmas Facing Not-for-Profit Hospitals 
Probe: Relationship of key issues to mission 
C.  Key Influencers in Process of Strategic Planning 
D.  Role of Marketing 
1.  Relationship of strategic planners and mission gatekeepers 
1.  Strategic planning role/influence 
2.  Changes, if any, in marketing emphasis andor direction 
3.  Range of services marketed 
Probe: Introduction, growth, and role of marketing department 
Probe: Services with the most impact (e.g., on needs of community, 
of hospital) and reasons why 
E.  Principal Strategic Planning Considerations 
A. Confidentiality Emphasized 
B.  Words of Appreciation 
IV.  Closing Remarks 
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Comment on Chapters 5 and 6  Bradford H. Gray 
As a sociologist who has worked for many years on the question of owner- 
ship form in health care, I have found the papers and discussion at this 
conference to be enormously interesting and stimulating. Like the con- 
ference itself, the papers I’ve been asked to discuss have a strong interdis- 
ciplinary flavor-Frank  and Salkever’s paper because they use the focus 
group methodology that comes out of  sociology (Merton and Kendall 
1946), and Skinner and Wennberg’s because it is a collaboration between 
an economist and an epidemiologist. 
Theoretical work in both sociology and economics suggests why  own- 
ership form might or might not make a difference in the performance of 
organizations. In sociology, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) suggested that 
organizations in the same field will  tend to look similar to each other 
because of coercive, imitative, and normative pressures toward isomor- 
phism. That is, all organizations are subject to the same regulatory and 
market pressures, all notice each other and copy what seems to work, and 
all are subject to social expectations. In health care, an important source 
of normative pressure comes from the professional values of physicians to 
which hospitals, for example, must pay attention. It should be noted, how- 
ever, that coercive and normative pressures are not identical for for-profits 
and not-for-profits  in health care. Not-for-profits’  tax exemptions as chari- 
table organizations and their ability to obtain donated funds may create 
both resources and external expectations of charitable behavior and the 
provision of public goods, even though, as Frank and Salkever note, chari- 
table contributions are now a very small part of the financial picture for 
most hospitals. 
Economics-particularly  in agency theory-has  also suggested reasons 
why ownership form may have little effect on organizational behavior. But 
economic theory regarding property rights, public goods, and contract 
failure has also given us reasons to expect differences in behavior (Hans- 
mann 1987). One implication of these ideas is that for-profit organizations 
might be more prone to exploit the informational asymmetries that typify 
health care-asymmetries  that involve not only patients but also third- 
party payers (Steinberg and Gray 1993). 
These various concepts do a pretty good job of accounting for the broad 
patterns that have been observed in the behavior of for-profits and not-for- 
profits in health care (see Gray 1991 for a summary). To broadly general- 
ize across studies, there are similar costs in hospitals although for-profits 
charge higher prices. There are similar levels of uncompensated care where 
need is low, but different levels and different geographic patterns of owner- 
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ship where the need is high. There are large sectoral differences in organi- 
zational involvement in educational and research activities, which contain 
an element of public good. There are similar levels of quality in hospitals 
(where normative pressures from physicians are strong), but there are dif- 
ferences in nursing homes (Marmor, Schlesinger, and Smithey 1987) and, 
perhaps, in HMOs (Gray 1997). 
It is good that Frank and Salkever went beyond formulating a problem 
and positing the way  they thought the world works to the collection of 
primary data and the modification of their initial presumptions on the 
basis of it. This particular set of focus groups, however, does not provide 
a strong basis for sweeping conclusions because of the small numbers, 
inclusion of some unintended hospital types, and limitation to two cities. 
Even with these limitations, Frank and Salkever found that the world is 
more complicated than they had expected, and they shared what they 
learned in an informative way. 
Economists sometimes seem to presume that ownership form is an epi- 
phenomenon and to expect, often implicitly, that behavior of not-for- 
profits and for-profits is essentially the same. Although Frank and Salkev- 
er’s model does not assume that the objective function of not-for-profit 
hospitals is profit maximization, they still have their suspicions. Even after 
reporting that the not-for-profit hospital executives in the focus groups all 
said they would not eliminate their hospital’s emergency room under “any 
conceivable circumstances,” Frank and Salkever still concluded in their 
original version of their paper that “profit maximization may be a reason- 
able  approximation of  not-for-profit objectives.’’  This formulation was 
changed in the final version of  the paper to read that not-for-profit hos- 
pitals place “a large weight on current and future profits in the face of 
perceived financial and competitive risks” (section 6.4.2). Although their 
original formulation is a better illustration of how our disciplinary back- 
ground shapes our perceptions (a phenomenon not peculiar to econo- 
mists), even their second formulation goes beyond the evidence, I think. 
As I read their evidence, not-for-profit hospitals engage in diversifica- 
tion activities in an attempt to allow themselves to continue to do what 
they have been doing. But they do not all define this identically.  Frank and 
Salkever’s surmise that diversification-and  profits resulting therefrom- 
may help explain why hospitals have been able to maintain (or build) both 
their profit margins and their uncompensated care load in the face of an 
increasingly competitive health care system is plausible to me. The fact 
that the focus groups provided little evidence that enhanced charity or 
public goods was their goal is worth reporting, to be sure, and this points 
to an important issue regarding our expectations of not-for-profit hospi- 
tals. As the respondents suggested, a hospital’s role in providing charity 
care may have been heavily influenced by decisions made decades earlier 
under different circumstances regarding where the hospital would be lo- 218  Comment on Chapters 5 and 6 
cated. After all, not-for-profit  hospitals vary with regard to their proximity 
to large numbers of poor and uninsured people, a fact that may relate to 
variations in their conceptions of their missions. Not-for-profits are not a 
homogeneous lot, a point that Weisbrod (1988) emphasizes in his analysis 
of the role of not-for-profits. They have considerable latitude in meeting 
community needs, as their trustees define them. Since neither the hospi- 
tals nor their administrators are a uniform lot, those who were selected to 
participate in a small number of focus groups are not necessarily represen- 
tative. Overgeneralization is a danger. 
The importance of not-for-profit hospitals’ self-definitions of mission 
has received public policy support. In 1969, the Internal Revenue Service 
changed its interpretation of the meaning of “charitable” for purposes of 
hospital tax exemptions from a definition that emphasized service to the 
poor to a definition, thought to be more realistic, that emphasized service 
to the community at large-the  so-called “community benefit” standard 
(Fox and Schaffer 1991). As trustee-governed institutions, hospitals define 
their missions for themselves, and as Frank and Salkever found, they do 
not necessarily do this in terms of service to the poor. Thus, there is little 
reason to expect that most hospitals’ diversification efforts would be un- 
dertaken to support service to the poor. Nor does service to the poor 
necessarily lie behind the intentions of donors to hospitals-particularly 
large donors who contribute to capital projects. If, as has happened in a 
few states, not-for-profit hospitals come under increased pressure to dem- 
onstrate that their charitable or community benefit activities are commen- 
surate with the value of their tax exemptions, fund raising and diversifi- 
cation activities may  become more focused on  generating revenues to 
support the activities that justify the tax exemption (Pauly 1996). Frank 
and Salkever’s finding that this purpose receives little mention now is inter- 
esting in light of the fact that Massachusetts is one of the states that has 
begun to demand greater accountability regarding tax-exempt status. 
As a final comment on Frank and Salkever’s paper, I would note that 
diversification is not new among hospitals, even if  it has increased in re- 
cent years. The phenomenon was attracting much attention when I first 
became involved in the for-profidnot-for-profit  topic 15 years ago. Several 
points were then being made, including how common diversification was 
and how often it was connected with corporate restructuring, which itself 
was driven in part by the goal of generating revenues to support the hospi- 
tal’s activity. The creation of separate organizational structures was then- 
and I suspect is now-driven  in part by tax rules and the need to separate 
out revenue streams that were subject to the unrelated business income 
tax. The fact that Frank and Salkever’s respondents did not mention tax- 
related reasons for diversification suggests that the nature of the phenome- 
non has changed from the earlier period. 
Turning to the Skinner and Wennberg paper, I will not repeat the pat- Comment on Chapters 5 and 6  219 
tern of findings that they have woven together to reach their conclusions, 
which 1  find convincing. They point us to a fundamental challenge in as- 
sessing the effects of a profit-maximizing orientation in health care, as 
well as the difficulty in measuring the efficiency of health services. These 
difficulties both result from our old friend-the  information asymmetry 
problem. But the findings may also be due to differences in physician pref- 
erences regarding how to respond to given sets of clinical circumstances. 
As with many earlier studies by Wennberg and his colleagues, Skinner 
and Wennberg find evidence that the volume of services in an area is di- 
rectly related to the supply of physicians and appears unrelated to underly- 
ing medical needs in the population (although perhaps not unrelated to 
patients’ preferences). An interesting aspect of this is their evidence that 
the extra services received by  the Miami patients are not only costly but 
that they may actually detract from patients’ well-being. This is extraordi- 
narily important in this period in which managed care plans are being 
criticized for policies that result in reduced hospital usage. 
Also important is  their evidence that there are high-utilizing places. 
Skinner and Wennberg show that Miami has much higher use of many 
services than does Minneapolis-hospitals,  ICUs, primary care visits, 
and, especially, specialist visits. What is it about a place like Miami that 
accounts for such patterns? The fact that some surgical procedures oc- 
curred at a higher rate in Minneapolis should warn us against simple ex- 
planations. Processes involving selection and patient preferences may be 
going on. However, the inclusion of this paper in this conference on for- 
profit and not-for-profit care suggests that the authors and conference or- 
ganizers saw it as relevant to that topic. This view has considerable plausi- 
bility. 
Why might Miami be a high-utilizing place? One way  that Miami dif- 
fers from Minneapolis is its very large Medicare population that attracts 
all kinds of profit-seeking organizations. About half of Florida hospitals 
are for-profit, and about half of those are owned by ColumbidHCA. This 
company, of course, has been charged with a wide variety of  manipula- 
tions of payment systems, and it used a much-criticized strategy of joint 
ventures with physicians to encourage their use of Columbia/HCA hos- 
pitals in ways that would enhance their profitability (Kuttner 1996). One 
possible result would be elevated admission rates. 
Fraud appears to be a major problem in Florida. In a presentation 
about Florida health care at the annual meeting of the American College of 
Medical Quality in Orlando in November 1997, James T. Howell, M.D., the 
secretary of the Florida Department of Health, described two recent inter- 
ventions aimed at reducing fraudulent care in Florida. The first, under- 
taken because home care costs were wildly out of control, was to require 
that home care organizations reapply for certification.  It was made known 
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the existing 1,600 certified agencies, 1,200 did not reapply. Dr. Howell also 
described how new practice guidelines involving less-invasive care were 
implemented for low back pain in Florida’s workers’ compensation pro- 
gram; a 62 percent reduction in costs occurred in the first year. His conclu- 
sion was that cost containment is hopeless in a fee-for-service system. 
Interestingly, the high rates of service utilization in Florida have made 
the state attractive for Medicare HMOs, since Medicare payment rates for 
HMOs are heavily influenced by costs within the fee-for-service system. 
(The 1997 average annual per capita cost (AAPCC) on which Medicare 
HMO costs are based was $748 per month in Dade county compared to 
$406 in Hennipin county.) Twelve of fifteen HMOs in Miami are for-profit. 
The largest most  notorious case of HMO fraud in the  Medicare pro- 
gram-the  International Medical Centers scandal-occurred  there a de- 
cade ago (see Gray 1991, chap. 6, for an account). 
If Miami is indeed a place in which entrepreneurial providers have been 
actively exploiting the vulnerabilities of payment systems, an interesting 
question arises. What will be the effect of managed care and associated 
strategies in a situation in which most of the HMOs are themselves for- 
profit and most of the physicians that they attract are strongly responsive 
to economic incentives? It would be very interesting to see the results of a 
Skinner and Wennberg analysis comparing HMO enrollees and nonenroll- 
ees in the two cities. In Minneapolis, with its high HMO penetration, all 
health plans are not-for-profits as a result of state law; in Miami, the for- 
profits overwhelmingly dominate. (Interstudy reports HMO penetration 
rates of 44 percent in Minneapolis and 52 percent in Miami.) Economists 
have long noted that the health care market is influenced in important 
ways  by  the fact that the customers-the  patients-do  not know their 
own needs and must rely on the advice of others (Arrow 1963). Managed 
care does not eliminate the vulnerability of patients, and it introduces new 
ways that those vulnerabilities can be exploited by those who are inclined 
to do so (Gray 1997). The study of patterns of services across geographic 
areas and delivery systems can provide important clues regarding when 
that might be happening. 
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Comment on Chapters 5 and 6  Frank Lichtenberg 
The fact that hospitals have experienced a period of tighter revenues and 
reduced demand for their traditional inpatient care services has raised 
concerns about their ability to provide traditional community-oriented 
services, such as hospital care to medically indigent populations. But the 
main conclusion of Richard Frank and David Salkever’s interesting paper 
is that neither increased price competition nor diversification of hospitals 
into new activities necessarily threatens the supply of public goods. 
Due to the hospital’s budget constraint, the supply of “public goods” is 
limited by its net income 
N  =  IT+  D  =(R-  C)+  D, 
where N = net income, R = revenue from traditional inpatient care ser- 
vices, C  = cost of traditional inpatient care services, IT  = profit from tra- 
ditional inpatient care services, and D  = donations (charitable contri- 
butions). The “naive” hypothesis is that dNldR = 1: A $1 reduction in 
traditional revenue results in a $1 reduction in net income available to 
support public good provision. However, Frank and Salkever’s analysis 
and evidence suggests that this view is too pessimistic: dNldR is much less 
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than one (and may even be negative!), because both C and D  do not re- 
main constant  when  R changes. I  would  paraphrase their  analysis as 
follows: 
C  =  OR  (8 >  0), 
D =-YT  (Y >  0). 
The first equation embodies the notion that hospitals may operate with 
some degree of X-inefficiency,’  and that they will reduce costs and ineffi- 
ciency when revenues are declining. Hence, profits will not fall as much 
as revenue. Between 1985  and 1995, the number of not-for-profit hospi- 
tals declined from 3,349 to 3,092, and the number of beds declined from 
707,000 to 610,000.*  Presumably,  the hospitals that closed had higher costs 
than those that remained open, so that this reduction of capacity contrib- 
uted to cost reduction. 
The second equation embodies the idea that the supply of charitable 
contributions is inversely related to profits: Donors are less inclined to 
contribute when the hospital is earning large profits. Hence, net income 
will not fall as much as profits. Substituting these two equations into the 
net income identity, 
N  =  - YT  =  ~(1  - e)(i - Y). 
Hence dNldR = (1 - 8) (1 - r), which is certainly less than one. At 
times Frank and Salkever seem to suggest that the cost-reduction efforts 
triggered by  declining revenue were so intense and effective that the net 
effect has been an increase in profits: “While hospitals have generally faced 
increasingly tight revenues, both for-profit and not-for-profit entities have 
managed to reduce costs sufficiently to increase margins in recent years” 
(section 6.2).  In other words, 0 > 1, so that dddR  = (1 -  0) <  0. Hospitals 
should have wished for a decline in revenues years ago! It is plausible to 
me that revenue decreases stimulate some cost reductions, but not that the 
latter are more than adequate to compensate for the for me^.^ Of course, 
the apparent decline in costs may have been completely unrelated to the 
decline in revenue. In any case, one should not infer from the revenue 
numbers alone that the provision of public goods is or is not threatened. 
The equation above reveals that even a decline in profit from traditional 
inpatient care services  (7~)  does not necessarily spell trouble for community- 
oriented services. If  donations are highly sensitive to hospital profitability 
1. The term X-ineficiency was coined by Harvey Leibenstein (1966). 
2. The increase in concentration may be partly responsible for the recent increase in hospi- 
tal profitability noted by  Frank and Salkever. See also Barro and Cutler’s (1997) case study 
of consolidation in the Massachusetts medical care marketplace. 
3. There is an obvious parallel in “supply-side economics”: A reduction in the tax rate (r) 
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(y > l), resources available to provide those services would be inversely 
related to profitability. There is no evidence to support this extreme view. 
But the point that the marginal response of donations to profits (y) acts 
like a “tax” on the supply of public goods is an important one. 
For simplicity, the preceding analysis ignored a source of net income 
(and determinant of donations) that figures prominently in Frank and Sal- 
kever’s analysis: diversification into nontraditional activities such as oper- 
ation of primary care clinics, imaging centers, and home health care com- 
panies. They argue that this diversification was prompted by the decline 
in traditional revenue sources and was a new source of profits that main- 
tained the financial health of  the hospital, including its ability to supply 
public goods. (But diversification per se may reduce donations directly, as 
well as indirectly by  increasing profits.) I am struck by  the contrast be- 
tween this sector and the world of business; the consensus seems to be 
that among corporations, excess profits (“free cash flow”), rather than de- 
clining revenues, triggers diversification, and that diversification destroys 
rather than creates shareholder value. I would also pose the question, If 
diversification was such a profitable strategy, why did hospitals have to be 
“forced” by declining traditional revenues to adopt it? 
The paper by  Jonathan Skinner and John Wennberg provides strong 
evidence for two puzzling facts. The first of these is that the intensity of 
medical resource use  varies dramatically across regions of  the United 
States (even after controlling for disease incidence). They report the fol- 
lowing ratios of per capita utilization in Miami to per capita utilization 
in Minneapolis: 
Home health services  4.1 
Inpatient services  I .5 
Inpatient Medicare expenditure (last 6 months of life)  2.0 
Primary MD visits (last 6 months of life)  1.8 
5.4  Specialist MD visits (last 6 months of life) 
~~ 
Such pronounced cross-sectional variation in medical resource use cries 
out for explanation. Skinner and Wennberg estimate regressions of aver- 
age Medicare Part A reimbursements in the last six months of life on a 
number of health, resource, and financial variables, and find that average 
reimbursements are positively correlated with hospital beds and specialist 
MDs per capita and with the percent of nongovernment hospitals that are 
for-profit. They recognize, though, that one cannot necessarily infer from 
this that the presence of high medical resources causes high medical ex- 
penditure. The equation that they estimate bears some resemblance to the 
accounting identity between expenditure and the price-weighted sum of 
the quantities of each type of medical service consumed. Since specialist 
visits per capita are much higher in Miami than Minneapolis, the only 
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number of specialists  per capita and average reimbursement would be that 
Miami specialists see far fewer patients per year or charge much lower 
fees. The reduced-form expenditure equation they estimate does not en- 
able us to identify, or test hypotheses about, the parameters of the medical 
input supply or demand functions. 
The second important fact that they document is that health outcomes 
(mortality) are uncorrelated across regions with medical resource use. Of- 
ten, there is reason to expect the cross-sectional correlation between in- 
puts and outputs to overstate the marginal productivity (or output elastic- 
ity) of inputs. Suppose that we  have data on output and employment for 
a cross-section of firms, and that the firms vary with respect to some unob- 
servable characteristic (such as managerial ability) that influences produc- 
tivity. In competitive equilibrium, the firms with greatest managerial abil- 
ity should employ the most workers, and as a result, the coefficient on 
employment in the production function would be biased upward. In other 
words, a positive input coefficient indicates not only that inputs are pro- 
ductive, on average, but also that they are allocated to the places where 
they are most productive; failure to observe a positive relationship be- 
tween medical resource use and outcomes suggests that neither of these 
is true. 
I have also examined the relationship between real medical expenditure 
and a measure of mortality; my analysis is at the national level using longi- 
tudinal data for a sample of 17 countries from the Organization for Eco- 
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD) health database. I distin- 
guished  three  types  of  medical  expenditure: inpatient  care  (INPAT), 
ambulatory care (AMBUL), and pharmaceuticals (PHARM), all mea- 
sured in  purchasing-power-parity-adjusted expenditure per capita. The 
average expenditure shares of these three inputs of the “health production 
function” are about 50 percent, 35 percent, and 15 percent, respectively. 
The mortality measure I used is potential life-years lost before age 65 per 
100,000 population (PLYL). The model that I estimated was 
In PLYL,,  =  P,ln INPAT,, + Pzln  AMBUL,, 
+ PJnPHARM,,  +  a,  +  6, +  ui,, 
where i = 1,  . . . ,  17 OECD countries; and t = 1960, 1965, .  . . , 1990. 
Since the model includes fixed country and year effects, estimates of the P 
coefficients reveal whether or not countries with above-average increases 
in per capita medical expenditures experienced above-average reductions 
in per capita life-years lost. (I think it would be desirable for Skinner and 
Wennberg to add cross-region data for at least one additional year to their 
sample, so that they could include fixed-region effects to control for stable, 
unobserved determinants of expenditure and/or outcomes.) The estimated 
equation was (t-statistics  in parentheses; N = 80): Comment on Chapters 5 and 6  225 
In PLYL,  = -  .038 In INPAT,, -  .092  In AMBUL,  -. 187 In PHARM, 
(0.51)  (1.79)  (2.51) 
+  (Yi  +  6, +  u,. 
Consistent with Skinner and Wennberg’s findings, there is not a statisti- 
cally significant relationship between inpatient expenditures-which  ac- 
count  for about half  of  total health care costs-and  this measure of 
premature mortality. The coefficient on ambulatory medical expenditure 
is  only marginally statistically significant. Pharmaceutical expenditure, 
which accounts for a fairly small share of total health expenditures, is the 
only component that has a highly significant (and large) effect on mortal- 
ity. (To assess the relative marginal productivity of the three inputs, one 
should divide the elasticities by their respective expenditure shares.) This 
finding is robust to changes in the mortality measure and the measure of 
pharmaceutical utilization. I also estimated models of the form 
lnX,  =  plnN-DRUGS,  +  cxi +  6, +  u,, 
where Xis a mortality measure and N-DRUGS  is annual per capita con- 
sumption of medicines (in defined daily dosages). The estimates of p are 
shown below: 
X  P 
Life expectancy of males at age 40 (N = 63)  .022 (2.55) 
Potential life-years lost before age 65 per 100,000 males (N = 83)  -.070  (2.18) 
Potential life-years lost before age 65 per 100,000 females (N = 83)  -.I29 (2.81) 
These estimates are consistent with the hypothesis that utilization of phar- 
maceuticals significantly reduces mortality. The positive relationship be- 
tween life expectancy and pharmaceutical use may partly reflect reverse 
causality, however: Since pharmaceutical consumption tends to increase 
with age (beyond age 40), exogenous increases in life expectancy may lead 
to increased pharmaceutical use. Since reverse causality should also result 
in overstatement of  the relationship between inpatient expenditure and 
mortality, the apparent absence of any relationship between the two is 
especially strong evidence that inpatient expenditure does not reduce mor- 
tality. 
The puzzle amply documented by  Skinner and Wennberg-failure  to 
detect a  relationship between  expenditures (especially public expendi- 
tures) and outcomes-is  not unique to this type of expenditure. As Ma- 
chado (1997) observes, 30 years ago the Coleman Report concluded that 
expenditures per student and school inputs had no measurable impact 
on student performance; the latter depended primarily on student back- 
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ther studies emerged, but very little consensus has been reached among 
researchers about whether, or how much, “money matters” in education. 
Machado attempted to determine the effect of public substance abuse 
treatment expenditures on outcomes (e.g., the number of  abstinent dis- 
charged patients) using data from Maine’s Office of  Substance Abuse 
(OSA). She noted that a simple regression of treatment outcomes on ex- 
penditures per patient showed no positive relationship between these two 
variables. She recognized, however, that failure to observe a relationship 
might be attributable to the potential endogeneity of expenditures: OSA 
might allocate more funds per patient to programs that treat more difficult 
patients.  Not  controlling for  patient  and  other  characteristics would 
dampen the estimated impact of  funds on outcomes. She pursued two 
different econometric strategies to attempt to address the endogeneity of 
funds per patient. But even after accounting for the potential endogeneity 
of expenditures, she concluded that “the marginal impact of expenditures 
per patient on the number of abstinent people in the state of Maine is so 
small that it is not economically significant.” 
The data presented by  Skinner and Wennberg about the allocation of 
medical resources in the United States were prepared with great skill and 
are of considerable interest and importance. Explanation of these relation- 
ships (or lack of relationship!) should be a high priority in future research. 
References 
Barro, Jason, and David Cutler. 1997. Consolidation in the Medical Care Market- 
place: A Case Study from Massachusetts. NBER Working Paper no. W5957. 
Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, March. 
Leibenstein, Harvey.  1966. Allocative Inefficiency  vs.  X-Inefficiency.  American 
Economic Review 56:392-415. 
Machado, Matilde Pinto.  1997. Dollars and Performance: Cost Effectiveness of 
Substance Abuse Treatment in Maine. Instituto de Analisis Economico, CSIC 
Universidad Autonoma de Barcelona, Spain. 